

Robust Model-Checking of Linear-Time Properties in Timed Automata

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
- 1 Context
- 2 Robust model-checking of pure-safety properties
- 3 Robust model-checking of LTL
- 4 Conclusion

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
Model-checking

Does the system satisfy the property?

Modelling




Model-checking




Timed automata (example)

x, y : clocks



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
x, y : clocks



	l_0	$\xrightarrow{\delta(4.1)}$	l_0	\xrightarrow{a}	l_1	$\xrightarrow{\delta(1.4)}$	l_1	\xrightarrow{b}	l_2
x	0		4.1		4.1		5.5		0
y	0		4.1		0		1.4		1.4

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


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→ timed word $(a, 4.1)(b, 5.5)$

Implementability of a timed automaton

- **“Implementing” a timed automaton assumes perfect hardware**

Infinitely punctual: exact synchronization of communications

Infinitely precise: clocks increase at the same rate

Infinitely fast: a timed automaton might have to perform actions faster and faster

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➔ Even if we prove that a timed automaton is correct, it may happen that it cannot be correctly implemented.

From implementability to robustness

- **A design point-of-view** [Altisen, Tripakis – FORMATS'05]
 - integrate architecture in the system \rightsquigarrow very general
 - defaults: - correctness depends on the architecture
 - faster is not always better

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From implementability to robustness [DDR04]

- A timed automaton \mathcal{A} is implementable w.r.t. property φ iff there exists Δ s.t. \mathcal{A}^Δ satisfies φ (for some properties φ).
- If \mathcal{A}^{Δ_0} satisfies φ , then for every $0 < \Delta < \Delta_0$, \mathcal{A}^Δ satisfies φ .
 \rightarrow "Faster is better"

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Case of pure-safety properties

[Puri – FTRTFT'98]



[De Wulf, Doyen, Markey, Raskin – FORMATS'04]

Theorem



Given a timed automaton \mathcal{A} and a set of bad states Bad , we can decide whether there exists $\Delta > 0$ s.t. $\text{Reach}(\mathcal{A}^\Delta) \cap \text{Bad} = \emptyset$.

It is equivalent to checking that $\left(\bigcap_{\Delta > 0} \text{Reach}(\mathcal{A}^\Delta) \right) \cap \text{Bad} = \emptyset$.



An example: standard semantics





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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

An example of enlarged semantics with $\Delta > 0$





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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

An example with Δ very small





An example with Δ very small





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

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

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


An example with Δ very small



An example with Δ very small



Difference between \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{A}^Δ



Case of pure-safety properties

[Puri – FTRTFT'98]

[De Wulf, Doyen, Markey, Raskin – FORMATS'04]

Theorem

Given a timed automaton \mathcal{A} and a set of bad states Bad , we can decide whether there exists $\Delta > 0$ s.t. $\text{Reach}(\mathcal{A}^\Delta) \cap \text{Bad} = \emptyset$.

It is equivalent to checking that $\left(\bigcap_{\Delta > 0} \text{Reach}(\mathcal{A}^\Delta) \right) \cap \text{Bad} = \emptyset$.

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Algorithm for computing $\left(\bigcap_{\Delta > 0} \text{Reach}(\mathcal{A}^\Delta)\right)$

1. build the region automaton G of \mathcal{A} ;
2. compute $\text{SCC}(G)$, the set of SCCs of G ;
3. $J := \text{Reach}(G, [q_0])$;
4. while $\exists S \in \text{SCC}(G). S \not\subseteq J$ and $S \cap J \neq \emptyset$,
 $J := J \cup S$;
 $J := \text{Reach}(G, J)$;
5. return(J);

- 1 Context
- 2 Robust model-checking of pure-safety properties
- 3 Robust model-checking of LTL**
- 4 Conclusion

The logic LTL

- The linear-time temporal logic **LTL** [Pnueli – FOCS'77]

$$\text{LTL} \ni \psi, \varphi ::= p \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \neg \varphi \mid \mathbf{X} \varphi \mid \varphi \mathbf{U} \psi$$

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$\mathbf{X} \varphi$




“In the next state” φ holds

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
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$\mathbf{X} \varphi$

$\varphi \mathbf{U} \psi$

$\mathbf{F} \varphi \equiv \top \mathbf{U} \varphi$



“In the next state” φ holds

φ holds “Until” ψ holds

φ holds “Eventually”

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“In the next state” φ holds

$\varphi \mathbf{U} \psi$



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φ holds “Eventually”

$\mathbf{G} \varphi \equiv \neg(\mathbf{F} \neg \varphi)$




φ “Always” holds

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- Examples of formulas:

- " p occurs infinitely often": $\mathbf{G} \mathbf{F} p$
- "a request is eventually granted": $\mathbf{G} (\text{request} \rightarrow \mathbf{F} \text{grant})$

Robust model-checking of LTL

Theorem

Robust model-checking of **LTL** properties is decidable and PSPACE-complete.

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- Model-checking of **LTL** properties can be reduced to model-checking of co-Büchi properties **[Wolper, Vardi, Sistla – FOCS'83]**
- Extend the classical region automaton with γ -transitions when a reachable region is adjacent to an SCC $\rightsquigarrow \mathcal{R}^*$
- Checking co-Büchi properties in \mathcal{A} and in \mathcal{R}^* is equivalent
“Taking a γ -transition in \mathcal{R}^* corresponds to taking a certain number of times the corresponding SCC in \mathcal{A} ”

- 1 Context
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Conclusion

- robust model-checking of **LTL** properties is PSPACE-complete
- robust model-checking of a small fragment of **MTL** (a real-time extension of **LTL**) in PSPACE:

$$\mathbf{G} (p \rightarrow \mathbf{F}_{\leq 5} q)$$

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- robust model-checking of **LTL** properties is PSPACE-complete
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Further work

- robust model-checking of **Safety-MTL**? Or even of **MTL**?
- synthesis of robust controllers?
- what about branching-time logics?