



## Dependence and Independence

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# Dependence and independence

$x = y$            $y$  is identical to  $x$

$=(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$            $\vec{y}$  depends on  $\vec{x}$

$\vec{x} \perp \vec{y}$            $\vec{y}$  is independent of  $\vec{x}$

# Axioms of dependence

- If  $x$  depends on  $\vec{y}$  and  $\vec{y} \subseteq \vec{z}$ , then  $x$  depends on  $\vec{z}$ .
- Whether  $x$  depends on  $\vec{y}$  or not, is not sensitive to the order of the elements of  $\vec{y}$ .
- If  $x$  depends on  $\vec{y}$  and each element of  $\vec{y}$  depends on  $\vec{z}$ , then  $x$  depends on  $\vec{z}$ .

The main one is the third, called **transitivity**.

# Axioms of independence

- $\vec{x}$  is always independent of  $\emptyset$ .
- If  $\vec{x}$  is independent of  $\vec{y}$ , then  $\vec{y}$  is independent of  $\vec{x}$ .
- Whether  $\vec{x}$  is independent of  $\vec{y}$  or not, is not sensitive to the order of the elements of  $\vec{x}$ , or of  $\vec{y}$ .
- If  $\vec{x}$  is independent of  $\vec{y}$  and  $\vec{x}\vec{y}$  is independent of  $\vec{z}$ , then  $\vec{x}$  is independent of  $\vec{y}\vec{z}$ .

The main one is the fourth, called Exchange Property.

- Linear dependence and independence in vector spaces.
- Algebraic dependence and independence in algebraically closed fields.
- Whitney (1933), Van der Waerden (1937): These concepts satisfy the same axioms!

- Discrete, disintegrated ( $x$  depends on  $\vec{y}$  if  $x \in \vec{y}$ , and is otherwise independent of  $\vec{y}$ ).
- Random variables, Bayesian networks, causality.
- Non-interference relation between two groups of concurrent processes sharing common resources.
- Functional and multivalued dependencies in databases.
- Logical (with Grädel, see below).
- Social choice theory (Arrow's Theorem).
- Non-locality phenomena in quantum physics (joint work with Abramsky).

- In models of “stable” theories one can define the concepts of dependence and independence so that the above axioms hold.
- Properties of the generated geometry determine the model up to isomorphism. (Shelah and others)
- The discrete case, vector spaces and algebraically closed fields are typical examples.

# Logical dependence and independence (with Grädel)

- A **team** is a set of assignments (here 4):

| x | y | z |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 2 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 |


- Alternatively, a set of “vectors” (here 3) of the same length.

- If  $\mathcal{M}$  is a model and  $X$  a team, then


$$\mathcal{M} \models_x x = y \iff s(x) = s(y) \text{ for } s \in X.$$

$$\mathcal{M} \models_x =(\vec{x}, y) \iff s(\vec{x}) \mapsto s(y) \text{ is a function on } X.$$


$$\mathcal{M} \models_x \vec{x} \perp \vec{y} \iff \forall s, s' \in X \exists s'' \in X \\ (s''(\vec{x}) = s(\vec{x}) \wedge s''(\vec{y}) = s'(\vec{y})).$$



$$x = y$$



$$=(x, y)$$



$$x \perp y$$

$$\mathcal{M} \models_x \phi \vee \psi \iff \exists Y \exists Z (X = Y \cup Z \wedge$$

$$\mathcal{M} \models_Y \phi \wedge$$

$$\mathcal{M} \models_Z \psi)$$

$\mathcal{M} \models_X \forall x \phi \iff \mathcal{M} \models_Y \phi$ , where

$$Y = \{s(a/x) : s \in X, a \in M\}$$

Grädel: Model checking for  $\mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathcal{I}$  is NEXPTIME-complete.

$$\vec{x} \perp_{\vec{y}} \vec{z}$$

Means: “ $\vec{x}$  and  $\vec{z}$  are independent, provided that  $\vec{y}$  is kept fixed”.

- 1  $\vec{z} \perp_{\vec{x}} \vec{y} \Rightarrow \vec{y}\vec{x} \perp_{\vec{x}} \vec{z}\vec{x}$  (Fixed Parameter Rule)
- 2  $\vec{x} \perp_{\vec{z}} \vec{y} \wedge \vec{u} \perp_{\vec{z}\vec{x}} \vec{y} \Rightarrow \vec{u} \perp_{\vec{z}} \vec{y}$ . (First Transitivity Rule)
- 3  $\vec{y} \perp_{\vec{z}} \vec{y} \wedge \vec{z}\vec{x} \perp_{\vec{y}} \vec{u} \Rightarrow \vec{x} \perp_{\vec{z}} \vec{u}$  (Second Transitivity Rule)

# The overall picture (with Kontinen. Galliani. Nurmi.)

$\mathcal{D} = \text{FO} + \exists(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$ : Downwards closed existential second order logic  
*Durand-Kontinen: Hierarchy results for  $\mathcal{D}$*

$\mathcal{I} = \mathcal{D} + \vec{x} \perp \vec{y}$ : Existential second order logic,  
and hence  $\vec{x} \perp_{\vec{y}} \vec{z}$  is definable in  $\mathcal{I}$

$\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{I} + \text{negation}$ : Second order logic

# Completeness Theorem (with Kontinen)

- First order consequences in  $\mathcal{D}$  can be axiomatized, general consequences not.
- Natural deduction, **disjunction elimination** replaced by:

$$\frac{A \vee B \quad \begin{array}{c} [B] \\ \vdots \\ C \end{array}}{A \vee C}$$

- Dependence **distribution** rule.
- Dependence **elimination** rule.

# Dependence Distribution Rule

- 1 Given  $\epsilon, x, y$  and  $f$ .
- 2 If  $\epsilon > 0$ , then there is  $\delta > 0$  depending only on  $\epsilon$  such that if  $|x - y| < \delta$ , then  $|f(x) - f(y)| < \epsilon$ .
- 3 Therefore, there is  $\delta > 0$  depending only on  $\epsilon$  such that if  $\epsilon > 0$  and  $|x - y| < \delta$ , then  $|f(x) - f(y)| < \epsilon$ .

# Dependence Elimination Rule

- 1 Assume that for every  $x$  and every  $\epsilon > 0$  there is  $\delta > 0$  depending only on  $\epsilon$  such that for all  $y$ , if  $|x - y| < \delta$ , then  $|f(x) - f(y)| < \epsilon$ .
- 2 Therefore, for every  $x$  and every  $\epsilon > 0$  there is  $\delta > 0$  such that for all  $y$ , if  $|x - y| < \delta$ , then  $|f(x) - f(y)| < \epsilon$ , and moreover, for another  $x'$  and  $\epsilon' > 0$  there is  $\delta' > 0$  such that for all  $y'$ , if  $|x' - y'| < \delta'$ , then  $|f(x') - f(y')| < \epsilon$  and if  $\epsilon = \epsilon'$ , then  $\delta = \delta'$ .

- Variables are “voters”, values are preference relations.
- A priori, a voter can vote many kinds of preference relations.
- Social welfare function is also a variable, the value of which is a preference relation which depends on the voters preference relations, trying to form a “democratic” common opinion.
- **Arrow's Theorem:** If the social welfare function respects unanimous opinion, and is independent of irrelevant alternatives, then it is a dictatorship.

# Application: Quantum physics (with Abramsky)

- Experimental model (team): Variables are inputs and outcomes of experiments.
- Dependencies express dependence of outcome on input.
- Independences express independence of outcomes from each other.

$$Y = \left| \begin{array}{ccccc} x_1 & y_1 & \dots & x_n & y_n \\ a_1^1 & b_1^1 & \dots & a_n^1 & b_n^1 \\ a_1^2 & b_1^2 & \dots & a_n^2 & b_n^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_1^m & b_1^m & \dots & a_n^m & b_n^m \end{array} \right|$$

A **hidden variable model** is of the form

$$Y = \begin{array}{c|cccccc} & x_1 & y_1 & \dots & x_n & y_n & z \\ \hline & a_1^1 & b_1^1 & \dots & a_n^1 & b_n^1 & \gamma^1 \\ & a_1^2 & b_1^2 & \dots & a_n^2 & b_n^2 & \gamma^2 \\ & \vdots & \vdots & \dots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ & a_1^m & b_1^m & \dots & a_n^m & b_n^m & \gamma^m \end{array}$$

where the  $\gamma^i$  are values of a hidden variable  $z$ .

A hidden variable model  $Y$  **satisfies** the experimental model  $X$  if  $X$  is the projection of  $Y$  to the domain of  $X$ .

A team  $X$  is said to support **single-valuedness of the hidden variable**  $z$  if  $z$  has only one value in the team.

We can express this with the formula

$$\exists!(z).$$

# Outcome-independence

An empirical team  $X$  is said to support **outcome - independence** if the following holds:

Suppose the team  $X$  has two measurement-outcome combinations  $s$  and  $s'$  with the same total input data  $\vec{x}$  and the same hidden variable  $z$ , i.e.  $s(\vec{x}) = s'(\vec{x})$  and  $s(z) = s'(z)$ . We demand that output  $s(y_i)$  should occur as an output also if the outputs  $s(\{y_j : j \neq i\})$  are changed to  $s'(\{y_j : j \neq i\})$ .

We can express output-independence with the formula

$$y_i \perp_{\vec{x}, z} \{y_j : j \neq i\}.$$

- **Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen result:** There is an empirical model (team) which cannot be realized by any hidden variable models satisfying single-valuedness and outcome independence.

- There is a **logic of dependence and independence**, giving a **unified** treatment of concepts from mathematics, computer science, statistics, etc.
- It gives a new analysis of **NP**.
- There is a natural **axiomatization**, but limits to completeness.
- It can be **applied** to gain understanding in a variety of fields (e.g. social choice, quantum physics).

Thank you!